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Pretrial Discovery of Expert Testimony 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
The need for pretrial disclosure is especially important with respect to 
scientific proof because this type of evidence is virtually impossible to test or 
rebut at trial without an advance opportunity to examine it carefully.1 The 
National Academy of Sciences 1992 DNA report recommended broad 
discovery: ''The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to 
defense counsel and experts retained by the defendant all material that might 
be necessary in evaluating the evidence.' '2 The report elaborated: ''All data 
and laboratory records generated by analysis of DNA samples should be 
made freely available to all parties. Such access is essential for evaluating 
the analysis.' '3 As one court put it, ''there are no scientific grounds for with-
holding information in the discovery process.' ' 4 
The President's DNA Initiative noted additional advantages to timely 
and comprehensive discovery: ''Early disclosure can have the following 
benefits: [1] Avoiding surprise and unnecessary delay, [2] Identifying the 
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on Giannelli & Imwinkel-
ried, Scientific Evidence (4th ed. 2007). Reprinted with permission. 
1 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1975) advisory committee's note ("[I]t is difficult to 
test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.''), reprinted at 
62 F.R.D. 312 (1974); Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discove1y, Scientific Evidence, 
and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REv. 791 (1991). 
2 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 146 
(1992) [hereinafter NRC I]. 
3 NRC I, supra note 2, at 23. See also id. at 105 (The program should maintain: 
"Case records-such as notes, worksheets, autoradiographs, and population data-
banks-and other data or records that support examiners' conclusions are prepared, 
retained by the laboratory, and made available for inspection on court order after 
review of the reasonableness of a request.''). 
The 1996 National Academies DNA report contains the following statement on 
discovery: "Certainly, there are no strictly scientific justifications for withholding 
information in the discovery process, and in Chapter 3 we discussed the importance 
of full, written documentation of all aspects of DNA laboratory operations. Such 
documentation would facilitate technical review of laboratory work, both within the 
laboratory and by outside experts. . . . Our recommendations that all aspects of 
DNA testing be fully documented is most valuable when this documentation is 
discoverable in advance of trial." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUA-
TION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 167-69 (1996) [hereinafter NRC II]. 
4 State v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486,495 (Ariz. 1998). 
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need for defense expert services, and [3] Facilitating exoneration of the in-
nocent and encouraging plea negotiations if DNA evidence confirms guilt.' '5 
Traditionally, criminal discovery has been far more limited than civil 
discovery. In civil cases, discovery includes the automatic identification of 
experts,6 comprehensive written reports/ and a special deposition provision 
for experts.8 Opponents of liberal discovery in criminal cases have argued 
that discovery will encourage perjury, lead to the intimidation of witnesses, 
and, due to the Fifth Amendment, be a one-way street.9 With scientific evi-
dence, however, these traditional arguments lose whatever force they might 
otherwise have. The first argument fails because ''it is virtually impossible 
for evidence or information of this kind to be distorted or misused because 
of its advance disclosure.' ' 10 Also, there is no evidence that experts have 
been intimidated, probably because the evidence co_uld be retested or another 
expert could testify about the examination.U Finally, the Self-Incrimination 
Clause as presently interpreted by. the Supreme Court presents little impedi-
ment to reciprocal prosecution discovery of scientific proof. 12 In addition, 
due process concems are eliminated by extensive defense discovery of sci-
entific evidence. As the Supreme Court has noted, due process "speak[s] to 
the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.'~ 13 A study of 
indigent defense systems by the National Center for State Courts noted that 
5 President's DNA Initiative, Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the 
Court(CD). 
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) ("Disclosure of Expert Testimony .... [A] party 
shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to 
present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.''). 
7 FED. R. Ov. P. 26(a)(2)(B) ("[T]his disclosure must be accompanied by a writ-
ten report-prepared and signed by the witness-if the witness is one retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as 
the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony."). 
8 FED. R. Ov. P. 26(b)(4)(A) ("A party may depose any person who has been 
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 
requires a report from the expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the 
report is provided."). 
9 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 252, at 36-37 (2d ed. 1982). 
1° Commentary, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE RELATING TO Discov-
ERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66 (Approved Draft 1 970). 
11 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 19.3, at 
490 (1984) ("Once the report is prepared, the scientific expert's position is not 
readily influenced, and therefore disclosure presents little danger of prompting 
peijury or intimidation"). See also People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 168 (Cal. 1995) 
(en bane) (autopsy report admitted as business record through the testimony of a 
pathologist who had not performed the autopsy; the pathologist who had conducted 
the autopsy ''had apparently left the coroner's office under unfavorable conditions''). 
12 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Fifth Amendment does not 
preclude prosecution discovery of evidence the defense intends to offer at trial). 
13 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,474 (1973). See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U.S. 600, 609 (1974) ('"Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and 
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the "greatest disparities occur in the areas of investigators and expert wit-
nesses, with the prosecutors possessing more resources.' ' 14 
There are several aspects to discovery in this context. The first is the 
identification of all persons who will testify as experts at trial. The second is 
the disclosure of the substance and basis of their testimony. Finally, the right 
to retest evidence must be bolstered by requiring the preservation of 
evidence. Unless the evidence has been preserved, it cannot be retested. 
I. Notice of Expert Testimony 
Many jurisdictions, including the federal courts, do not require the pros-
ecution to provide a list of witnesses it intends to call at trial. Nor are 
discovery depositions generally permitted in criminal cases. Nevertheless, as 
noted below, discovery of scientific reports is typically authorized, and the 
existence of such reports provides notice that an expert may be called to 
testify. 
The problem, however, is that the absence of a report does not necessar-
ily mean that an expert will not testify. This is so for a rather simple reason: 
nothing in most discovery rules requires that a report be written, even if a 
scientific test is performed. As a result, the defendant in United States v. 
Shue15 was not entitled to the verbal report of an FBI photographic expert 
who compared pictures of Shue with those of a ba.ik robber. Unkno"l-vn to t.1e 
defense, the expert made the comparison the night before he testified. 
Similarly, a police officer in United States v. Johnsmz 16 testified as an emer-
gency medical technician without notice to the defense. Although the defense 
argued that the testimony was ''highly prejudicial'' because it contradicted 
an important aspect of the defense case, the Eleventh Circuit merely noted 
that there is no right to a witness list and the federal discovery provision, 
Rule 16, was not implicated because ''no . . . reports were made in this 
case.'' 
The Wayne Williams prosecution provides another illustration!-'7 The 
trial turned on fiber evidence, an "essential part" of the case, according to 
the FBI expert who testified for the prosecution.18 This evidence was critical 
for two reasons: it connected Williams to the crime scenes of the two 
homicides for which he was charged, and just as importantly, it connected 
the individual dealing with the State . . .. "); Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (The "adversary system presupposes accurate and 
just results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed 
interests . . .. "). 
14 ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT 
DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100 (1992). 
15 United States v. Shue 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985). 
16 United States v. Johnson 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11th Cir. 1983). 
17 Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1983). 
18 H.A. Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial (Part I), 53 
F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 13 (Mar. 1984). 
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him with ten other murders, evidence of which was introduced as "other 
acts" proof. One of the three prosecution fiber experts was Barry Gaudette, 
who worked for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He examined fiber and 
hair samples for eleven days and then testified from personal notes. Gaud-
ette, however, did not prepare a written report, and thus the defense, ruled 
the Georgia Supreme Court, was not entitled to discovery. 19 The dissent 
rejoined: 
By allowing an expert to forgo delivery of a full written report and to 
later testifY orally where, as here, he had ample time to prepare such a 
written report and conducted tests too complex to remember unaided, we 
permit ever more egregious i~ustice and violation of the intent [of the 
discovery statute], which is to put into the defendant's hands these reports 
with sufficient time before trial to enable him to check and challenge their 
content.20 
To remedy the problem in the Shue and Johnson cases, Federal Rule 
16(a)(l)(G)21 was adopted. It requires a summary of expected expert 
testimony upon request. This provision was intended to "expand federal 
criminal discovery" in order to "minimize surprise that often results from 
unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to 
provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's 
testimony through focused cross-examination. " 22 The ABA Standards track 
the federal rule. 23 Although the summary requirement precludes ''trial by 
ambush,'' most jurisdictions have not adopted it. 
ii. laboratory Reports 
The ABA Standards provide for the discovery of scientific reports. 24 
19 See also Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 906-07 (Ga. 1983) (discovery statute 
applies only to written, not oral, reports). 
20 Williams, 312 S.E.2d at 100 (Justice Smith). 
21 The rule provides: 
(G) Expert witnesses.-At the defendani's request, the government must give to 
the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends 
to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Ruies of Evidence during its 
case-in-chief at trial .... The summary provided under this subparagraph must 
describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and 
the witness's qualifications. 
22 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, advisory committee's note, reprinted at 147 F.R.D. at 
387. 
23 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, DISCOVERY, Standard ll-2.1(a)(iv) 
(3d ed. 1996) ("With respect to each expert whom the prosecution intends to call as 
a witness at trial, the prosecutor should also furnish to the defense a cuniculum vitae 
and a written description of the substance of the proposed testimony of the expert, 
the expert's opinion, and the underlying basis of that opinion."). 
24 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, DISCOVERY, Standard ll-2.l(a)(iv) 
(3d ed. 1996) ("Any reports or statements made by experts in connection with the 
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Virtually all jurisdictions have comparable provisions. 25 For example, 
Federal Rule 16(a)(1)(F) makes the ''results or reports of physical or mental 
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments" discoverable. Unfortu-
nately, these rules do not specifY the content of the report. In contrast to the 
Federal Criminal Rules, the Civil Rules require that the report contain: 
(i) a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and 
reasons them; 
(ii) the data or other information considered by the witness in forming 
them; 
(iii) any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for them; 
(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored 
in the preceding I 0 years; 
(v) a list of all other cases in which, previous four years, the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and 
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony.26 
The lack of information in crime laboratory reports is not accidental. 
The Journal of Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the American 
Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on the ethical re-
sponsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989.27 One article criticized a number 
of laboratory reporting practices, including ( 1) ''preparation of reports 
containing minimal information in order not to give the 'other side' ammu-
nition for cross-examination,'' (2) ''reporting of findings without an inter-
pretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be 
provided from the witness box,'' and (3) ''[o]mitting some significant point 
from a report to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner. " 28 These deplorable 
practices could be curbed, if not eliminated, by requiring comprehensive 
laboratory reports.29 
Comprehensive lab reports serve several critical purposes. First, such 
reports are a quality control mechanism because they ensure that the 
examiner has followed the prescribed procedure and permit external review. 
case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, ex-
periments, or comparisons.''). 
25 See UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 421(a) (Approved Draft 1974) ("expert reports"). See 
also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND 
GOALS, REPORT IN COURTS, Standard 4.9(3) (1973). 
26 FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
27 Joseph L. Peterson, Symposium: Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Sciences, 34 
J. FoRENSIC Sci. 717 (1989). 
28 Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: 
Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 719, 724 (1989). Lucas served as the 
Director, The Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor General, 
Toronto, Ontario. 
29 Laboratory reports have also been fabricated. See State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 
1284, 1285 (Me. 1979) (FBI analyst "reported results of lab tests that he did not in 
fact conduct."); State v. DeFronzo, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ohio C.P. 1978) (Expert 
represented that certain lab tests were conducted when ''no such tests were ever 
conducted.''). 
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Second, they assist attorneys prepare for t:Jial, enabling them to render effec-
tive representation. Third, defense counsel's decision to seek appointment of 
a defense expert often requires a prelimiiiary evaluation by an expert.30 An 
expert might be willing to offer such an assessment, based upon the informa-
tion contained in such reports, without compensation. 
A laboratory report should be sufficiently comprehensive so that an in-
dependent expert can identify the process used and the conclusions reached. 
The DNA Advisory Board31 Standards require reports to include (1) a case 
identifier, (2) a description of evidence examined, (3) a description of the 
methodology, (4) the locus tested, (5) the results and /or conclusions, (6) an 
interpretative statement (either quantitative or qualitative), (7) the date is-
sued, (8) the disposition of evidence, and (9) a signature and title, or equiva-
lent identification, of the person(s) accepting responsibility for the content of 
the report.32 The American Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory Ac-
creditation Board (ASCLDILAB) requires laboratory reports to include (1) 
an ''accurate summary of significant material contained in the case notes,'' 
(2) ''interpretive information as well as examination results wherever pos-
sible," and (3) identification of "the analyst(s) and, if approp1iate, the test-
i11g methodology.' ' 33 
The ABA Standards on DNA Evidence go beyond these measures. Pmi 
III of the Standards governs testing of DNA Evidence and includes provi-
30 See Paul C. Giannelli, Alee v. Oldahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a 
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1312-13 (2004) 
(discussing the various reports); Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Chal-
lenge of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, I 008 (1998) 
("Courts, as gatekeepers, must be aware of how difficult it can be for some parties-
particularly indigent cri1ninal defendants-to obtain an expert to testify. The fact 
that one side may lack adequate resources with which to fully develop its case is a 
constant problem.''). 
31 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 created a DNA Advisory Board (DAB) to 
assist in promulgating quality assurance standards. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (b) (2004). 
32 DAB Standard 11.1.2 ( 1998). 
33 ASCLD Guidelines for Forensic Laboratmy j\1anagement Practices, 14 CruME 
LABORATORY DIG. 39, 43 (Apr. 1987). As one scientist has observed: "For a report 
from a crime laboratory to be deemed competent, I think most scientists would 
require it to contain a minimum of three elements: (a) a description of the analytical 
techniques used in the test requested by the government or other party, (b) the 
quantitative or qualitative results with any appropriate qualifications concerning the 
degree of certainty surrounding them, and (c) an explanation of any necessary 
presumptions or inferences that were needed to reach the conclusions." Professor 
Anna Harrison, Mount Holyoke College, Symposium on Science and the Rules of 
Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 632 (1984). 
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sions on laboratories and the testing and interpretation of DNA evidence. 34 
Adopted in 2006, the Standards recommend: (1) laboratory accreditation 
every two years, (2) written policies, including protocols for testing and 
interpreting test results, (3) quality assurance procedures, including audits, 
proficiency testing, and corrective action protocols, (4) procedures designed 
to minimize cognitive bias when interpreting test results, and (5) timely 
reports of credible evidence of lab. misconduct or serious negligence.35 
Comprehensive laboratory reports are also recommended.36 Standard 4-1 
requires disclosure of these reports as well as any additional information that 
could bear on the validity of the results or interpretation. "Problems" dur-
ing testing, including anything that would be required to be entered into a 
quality control file (e.g., failure of controls or contamination from someone 
in the lab or the janitorial stafi), should be noted in the report. 
The limitations of the technique need to be specified in the report. The 
National Academy of Sciences report on bullet lead evidence contained the 
following recommendation: ''The conclusions in laboratory reports should 
be expanded to include the limitations of compositional analysis of bullet 
lead evidence. In particular, a further explanatory comment should ac-
company the laboratory conclusions to readily portray the limitations of the 
evidence.' ' 37 
B. Comprehensibility 
The purpose of forensic testing is to assist the criminal justice system in 
fulfilling its function to convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent. Ac-
cordingly, participants in the system need to understand the significance of 
the test results. Overworked prosecutors and defense attorneys lack the time 
to sort through technical data in order to appreciate the probative value of 
the lab analysis. An understandable summary would also assist jurors, and 
examiners are in the best position to provide such a summary. 
The National Academy of Sciences report on bullet lead evidence also 
addressed this issue: "[A] section of the laboratory report translating the 
technical conclusions into language that a jury could understand would 
greatly facilitate the proper use of this evidence in the criminal justice 
system."38 Accepting this position, ABA DNA Standard 3.3(c) requires that 
a section of the laboratory report state the scientific result in language that a 
nonscientist would understand. 
34 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, DNA EVIDENCE (2007). The Stan-
dards include provisions on: (I) collection, preservation and retention, (2) pretrial 
disclosure, (3) defense testing and retesting, (4) admissibility of DNA evidence, (5) 
post-conviction testing, (6) charging persons by DNA profile, and (7) DNA 
databases. The author served as Reporter for the DNA Standards. 
35 ABA Standard 3.1 (testing laboratories). 
36 ABA Standard 3.3. 
37 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET 
LEAD EVIDENCE 110-11 (2004). 
38 NATIONAL REsEARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 37, at 110-11. 
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C. Testimony Beyond the Report 
Experts should generally not testify beyond the scope of the report 
without issuing a supplemental report. Otherwise, trial by ambush results. 
Troedel v. Wainwright,89 a capital murder case, illustrates the problem. In 
that case, a report of a gunshot residue test using neutron activation analysis 
concluded that swabs "from the hands of Troedel and Hawkins contained 
antimony and barium in amounts typically found on the hands of a person 
who has discharged a firearm or has had his hands in close proximity to a 
discharging firearm.'' The FBI expert testified in accordance with this report, 
at Hawkins' trial but enhanced his testimony at Troedel's trial, where he 
testified that ''Troedel had fired the murder weapon.'' During federal habeas 
proceedings, the expert testified in a deposition that "he could not, from the 
results of his tests, determine or say to a scientific certainty who had fired the 
murderweapon" and the "amount of barium and antimony on the hands of 
Troedel and Hawkins were b~sically insignificant.'' The district court fo~d 
the trial testimony, "at the very least," misleading. Moreover, the expert 
claimed that the prosecutor had "pushed" him further in Troedel's trial, a 
claim the prosecutor substantiated.40 In granting habeas relief, the court 
found: 
In light of this admission, the above testimony received at the evidentiary 
hearing and the inconsistent positions taken by the prosecution at 
Hawkins' and Troedel's trials, respectively, the Court concludes that the 
opinion Troedel had fired the weapon was known by the prosecution not 
to be based on the results of the neutron activation analysis tests, or on 
any scientific certainty or even probability. Thus, the subject testimony 
was not only misleading, but also was used by the State knowing it to be 
misleading. 41 
The Troedel case is not atypical. Experts are frequently pressured by at-
torneys to "push the envelope"-not a surprising occurrence in an adver-
sary system. ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.3(a) provides: "A prosecu-
tor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the independence of 
the expert and should not seek to dictate the fonnation of the expert's opinion 
on the subject. To the extent necessary, the prosecutor should explain to the 
expert his or her role in the trial as an impartial expert called to aid the fact 
39 Troedel v. Wainwright 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 828 
F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987). 
40 667 F. Supp. at 1459 ("Next, as Mr. Riley [the expert] candidly admitted in his 
deposition, he was 'pushed' further in his analysis at Troedel 's trial than at Hawkins' 
trial. Furthermore, at the March 26th evidentiary hearing held before this Court, one 
of the prosecutors testified that, at Troedel' s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his 
opinion which was contained in his written report, the prosecutor pushed to 'see if 
more could have been gotten out of this witness.' When questioned why, in the 
Hawkins trial, be did not use Mr. Riley's opinion that Troedel had fired the weapon, 
the prosecutor responded be did not know why."). 
41 667 F. Supp. at 1459-60. 
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finders . . .. '' 42 The commentary to this Standard states: ''Statements made 
by physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts about their experiences as 
witnesses in criminal cases indicate the need for circumspection on the part 
of prosecutors who engage experts. Nothing should be done by the prosecu-
tor to cast suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the expert 
color an opinion to favor the interests of the prosecutor.' '48 
Ethical standards are fine but in this context requiring comprehensive 
lab reports may be more effective. An express statement of the limitations of 
the technique in the report, and a requirement that an expert not testify be-
yond the conclusions stated in the report, would protect experts from over-
reaching by attorneys. A supplemental report can be issued if new informa-
tion is received. 
Ill. Bench Notes 
Timothy Spencer was the first person executed based on DNA evidence.44 
Yet, when the defense sought discovery of the prosecution expert's "work 
notes," which formed the basis ofhis report, the motion was denied, and the 
Virginia Supreme Court upheld this ruling.45 Why? 
Access to bench notes is critical. One of the most notorious cases 
involved Fred Zain, the Chief Serologist in the West Virginia State Police 
Crime Laboratory, who falsified test results in as many as 134 cases from 
1979 to 1989.46 A judicial report concluded: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (l) overstating the 
strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on in-
dividual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic 
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items 
of evidence had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) 
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering labora-
tory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that 
genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to 
report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting 
additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (l 0) implying a match with 
a suspect when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (11) 
reporting scientifically impossible or improbable resultsY 
A forensic scientist would later comment: "It is also clear that in case after 
case, defense counsel failed to review the case notes of the prosecution's fo-
42 A comparable Standard applies to defense counsel. ABA Standard 4-4.4(a). 
43 Commentary, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION 59 (3d ed. 1993). 
44 Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA ·Tests, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1994. 
45 Commonwealth v. Spencer, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989). 
46 See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need 
to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REv. 163, 172-74 (2007). 
47 In reInvestigation of theW. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501, 503 (W.Va. 1993) (quoting report). 
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rensic serologists. Even a layperson would have seen that Fred Zain's writ-
ten reports and sworn testimony were contradicted by his case notes.' '48 
Zain was not alone. John Willis was convicted of rape in 1992, despite 
his protests of innocence. At his trial, Dr. Pam Fish, a serologist in the 
Chicago Crime Lab, testified that her tests were "inconclusive"-i.e., that 
they had neither included nor excluded Willis as the source of semen. Willis, 
dubbed the ''beauty shop rapist,'' was convicted and sentenced to 100 years 
of imprisonment. Seven years later, he was exonerated by DNA testing. At 
that time, Fish's lab notes surfaced, indicating that Willis's blood type (type 
A) excluded him as the source of the semen (type B). Fish had failed to ac-
knowledge this "problem" during her testimony. "Fish's misleading 
testimony in the Willis case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man 
and allowed a predator to continue roaming the streets, shows why the state 
should have turned over all of Fish's laboratory notes and data, rather than 
merely presenting her final report.' ' 49 
Bench notes have been cited in other crime lab scandals. The 1997 I.G. 
Report on the FBI Laboratory's explosive unit identified a somewhat differ-
ent issue-inadequate bench notes: "The Rudolph files and some of Martz's 
work underscore the importance of case files containing all the documenta-
tion necessary for another appropriately qualified examiner to be able to 
understand aud replicate the examiners's data and analysis. We encountered 
the problem of incomplete or missing documentation in many case files.' '50 
Similarly, the investigation into the Houston Crime Lab fiasco found the 
same deficiency: ''Among other problems it identified, the 2002 [state] audit 
found that no such written procedures [for case notes and lab reports] existed 
and identified numerous deficiencies in the documentation contained in the 
lab reports.' ' 51 
A. Delaware v. Fensterer 
In one Supreme Court case, Delaware v. Fensterer,52 an FBI analyst 
48 Walter F. Rowe, Commentary, in EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CoNVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xvii-xviii (1996). 
49 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FJVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 125 (2000). See also Gian-
nelli, supra note 46, at 185-87 (discussing Willis case). 
50 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORA-
TORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCON-
DUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES (1997) (recommending the prep-
aration of adequate case files to support reports). See also Giannelli, supra note 46, 
at 195-96 (discussing report). 
51 THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT JNVESTIGA TOR FOR THE HOUSTON Po-
LICE DEP'T CRIME LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 28 (June 30, 2005). See also 
Giannelli, supra note 46, at 187-91 (discussing Houston crime lab). 
52 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (right of confrontation satisfied 
even ifwitness claims lack of memory on cross-examination). 
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testified that he could not remember which of three methods he had used to 
determine that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly removed, a 
significant issue in the case. He apparently neglected to record this critical 
information. Yet, the Supreme Court declined to find a confrontation viola-
tion in this situation. On remand, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held the opinion inadmissible, but on evidentiary, rather than constitutional, 
grounds. According to that court: "While a witness's mere lack of memory 
as to a particular fact may go only to the weight of that evidence, an expert 
witness's inability to establish a sufficient basis for his opinion clearly 
renders the opinion inadmissible under D.R.E. 705. " 53 
But the question remains: How could an expert who conducted a foren-
sic examination fail to make a record? As one judge correctly observed: 
It is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted 
from which absolutely no notes or records survive. Unless of course the 
omission was deliberate. A basic principle of scientific testing is that care-
ful records of test procedure and results are to be scrupulously 
maintained. A scientific test without an accompanying report of the test-
ing environment, number of trials, raw result and analyzed data is in real-
ity no test at all.54 
The issue resurfaced in a recent cartridge identification case, United States v. 
Monteiro. 55 Because the expert did not make any sketches or take any 
photographs, adequate documentation was lacking. The court wrote: ''Until 
the basis for the identification is described in such a way that the procedure 
performed by Sgt. Weddleton is reproducible and verifiable, it is inadmis-
sible under Rule 702 [as expert testimony]." 
B. DNA Cases 
The requirements mandated in DNA profiling provide a model. DNA 
Advisory Board Standard 11.1 (1998) requires laboratories to adopt and fol-
low written procedures for taking and maintaining case notes to support the 
conclusions drawn in laboratory reports. The ABA DNA Standards also rec-
ommend that laboratory protocols and procedures be publicly available and 
that each step in the testing of DNA evidence and in the interpretation of the 
test results be recorded contemporaneously in case notes.56 The Standards 
also require disclosure of all case notes, raw electronic data, and lab reports. 57 
These requirements should not be limited to DNA cases. 
IV. Other Information 
In addition to lab reports and bench notes, other information is often 
53 Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, II 09-I 0 (Del. I986). 
54 Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. I983) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
55 United States v. Monteiro 407 F. Supp. 2d 35I, 374 (D. Mass. 2006). 
56 See ABA DNA Standard 3.2 (Testing and interpretation of DNA evidence). 
57 See ABA DNA Standard 4.I (Disclosure). 
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needed to prepare for trial. Early DNA cases recognized the need for 
extensive pretrial discovery beyond laboratory reports. In United States v. 
Yee,58 the district court required disclosure of matching criteria, environmen-
tal insult studies, population data, and proficiency test results. People v. Cas-
tro, 59 State v. Charles,60 and Ex parte Perry61 also recognized the need for 
extensive discovery. Similarly, a number of state DNA admissibility statutes 
require pretrial notice and discovery.62 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 417 
58 United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629, 635 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
59 People v. Castro 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("I) Copies of auto-
rads, with the opportunity to examine the originals. 2) Copies of laboratory books. 
3) Copies of quality control tests run on material utilized. 4) Copies of reports by the 
testing laboratory issued to proponent. 5) A written report by the testing laboratory 
setting forth the method used to declare a match or non-match, with actual size 
measurements, and mean or average size measurement, if applicable, together with 
standard deviation used. 6) A statement by ·the testing lab, setting forth the method 
used to calculate the allele frequency in the relevant population. 7) A copy of the 
data pool for each loci examined. 8) A certification by the testing lab that the same 
rule used to declare a match was used to determine the allele frequency in the 
population. 9) A statement setting forth observed contaminants, the reasons 
therefore, and tests performed to determine the origin and the results thereof. I 0) If 
the sample is degraded, a statement setting forth the tests performed and the results 
thereof. II) A statement setting forth any other observed defects or laboratory er-
rors, the reasons therefore and the results thereof. 12) Chain of custody 
documents.''). 
60 State v. Charles, 617 So. 2d 895,896 (La. 1993) ("(a) The computations which 
were performed in order to calculate the probability of a match; (b) The evidence on 
which the state's laboratory relied to reach the following two assumptions (i) that 
the genotypes in each system are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium proportions; and 
(ii) all four systems are independently distributed in the populations; (c) How the 
tables used by the laboratory were obtained in order to reach its conclusion that the 
genotypes in each system are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium proportions and all 
four systems are independently distributed in the population; (d) How many 
individuals were used to calculate the frequencies in each column of the tables and 
how those individuals can be characterized demographically; and (e) What evidence 
was used to reach a conclusion that a bin width of 1/8% is reasonable including a 
scientific explanation of just what was analyzed and how it was analyzed.'' ). 
61 586 So. 2d 242, 255 (Ala. 1991). 
62 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 54-86k(c) (1999) (2I day notice); MD. CTS. & PROC. 
CoDE§ 10-9I5(C) (1998) ("In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a DNA 
profile is admissible to prove or disprove the identity of any person, if the party 
seeking to introduce the evidence of a DNA profile: (1) Notifies in writing the other 
party or parties by mail at least 45 days before any criminal proceeding; and (2) 
Provides, if applicable and requested in writing, the other party or parties at least 30 
days before any criminal proceeding with: (i) First generation film copy or suitable 
reproductions of autoradiographs, dot blots, slot blots, silver stained gels, test strips, 
control strips, and any other results generated in the course of the analysis; (ii) Cop-
ies of laboratory notes generated in connection with the analysis, including chain of 
custody documents, sizing and hybridization information, statistical calculations, 
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specifically provides for discovery of DNA materials in all felony prosecu-
tions, as well as in post-trial and post-conviction proceedings, including: 
(I) Copies of the case file including all reports, memoranda, notes, phone 
logs, contamination records, and data relating to the testing performed in 
the case. 
(ii) Copies of any autoradiographs, lumigraphs, DQ Alpha Polymarker 
strips, PCR gel photographs and electropherogams, tabular data, 
electronic files and other data needed for full evaluation of DNA profiles 
produced and an opportunity to examine the originals, if requested. 
(iii) Copies of any records reflecting compliance with quality control 
guidelines or standards employed during the testing process utilized in 
the case. 
(iv) Copies of DNA laboratory procedure manuals, DNA testing protocols, 
DNA quality assurance guidelines or standards, and DNA validation 
studies. 
(v) Proficiency testing results, proof of continuing professional education, 
current curriculum vitae and job description for examiners, or analysts 
and technicians involved in the testing and analysis of DNA evidence in 
the case. 
(vi) Reports explaining any discrepancies in the testing, observed defects 
or laboratory errors in the particular case, as well as the reasons for those 
and the effects thereof. 
(vii) Copies of all chain of custody documents for each item of evidence 
subjected to DNA testing. 
(viii) A statement by the testing laboratory setting forth the method used 
to calculate the statistical probabilities in the case. 
(ix) Copies of the allele frequencies or database for each locus examined. 
(x) A list of all commercial or in-house software programs used in the 
DNA testing, including the name of the software program, manufacturer 
and version used in the case. 
(xi) Copies of all DNA laboratory audits relating to the laboratory 
performing the particular tests.63 
A number of specific documents are discussed below, e.g., case files, profi-
ciency test results, lab protocols, and calibration records. 
A. Case Files 
The DNA Advisory Board Standards require laboratories to maintain a 
case record in which all documentation generated by examiners relating to 
the case is retained.64 Typically, the case file will i11clude electropherograms, 
chain of custody documents, case correspondence, lab notes, etc. ASCLD/ 
LAB requires sufficient documentation so that an independent expert could 
evaluate whether the analysis was properly performed. There are still signif-
icant interpretative issues in DNA profiling. As several commentators have 
noted: ''The complexity of short tandem repeat (STR) testing makes it dif-
and worksheets; (iii) Laboratory protocols and procedures utilized in the analysis; 
(iv) The identification of each genetic locus analyzed; and (v) A statement setting 
forth the genotype data and the profile frequencies for the databases utilized.''); VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 19.2-270.5 (2002) (21 day notice). 
63 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 417(b). 
64 DAB Standard 11.1. 
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ficult if not impossible for a lawyer to evaluate the evidence without expert 
assistance. Defense lawyers generally need expert assistance to look behind 
the laboratory report and evaluate whether its conclusions are fully sup-
ported by the underlying data." 65 In particular, electropherograms need to be 
reviewed. 
B. Proficiency Tests 
The testifying examiner's record of proficiency testing should also be 
disclosed.66 As the Maryland Court of Appeals commented: The expert's 
''qualifications, including her record in proficiency tests, also are relevant to 
the weight the fact-finder might give the test results based on its assessment 
ofher competency."67 
C. laboratory Protocols 
ABA DNA Standard 3.1 provides for public access to lab policy and 
procedures, including written protocols. To the extent that such material is 
not publicly available, it is discoverable. As one court has observed: "Given 
that no outsider may observe testing within the laboratory, it is understand-
able that the defense would seek to obtain the lab's standard operating 
procedures in order to evaluate the sufficiency of those procedures and 
determine if they were followed in the tests actually performed in a given 
case. " 68 
D. Calibration Records 
Maintenance and calibration records for any instrumentation used in 
testing should also be subject to discovery. According to one court, ''the de-
fendant was entitled to challenge the accuracy of any test and to understand 
exactly how the test was performed. He was not required to demonstrate, 
65 William C. Thompson et al., Part II: Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence, 
CHAMPION 24, 26 {May 2003). 
66 See State v. Proctor, 559 S.E.2d 318, 322-23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("The profi-
ciency test results could very well be material to the preparation of Proctor's defense. 
All proficiency test results of the DNA analyst involved in the case must be 
produced. Defense counsel has the right to cross examine the DNA analyst regard-
ing his or her performance on proficiency tests. A failing grade by the DNA analyst 
on his or her proficiency tests is clearly relevant in the judge's evaluation of the 
expert's competency and most probably reflects negatively on the reliability of the 
DNA evidence introduced at trial. The trial court abused its discretion in denying 
discovery of the proficiency test results pursuant to Rule 5. "). 
67 Cole v. State, 835 A.2d 600, 610 (Md. 2003). 
68 835 A.2d at 609. See also State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
(''laboratory protocols, incidences of false positive results, quality control and qual-
ity assurance, and proficiency tests'' discoverable). 
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before even gaining access to the desired information and documents, that 
the test results were inaccurate or the procedures faulty.' '69 
V. Preservation of Evidence 
ABA Discovery Standards provide for the right to retest evidence in the 
government's possession,70 and ABA Resolution No. 115 reads: "All 
biological evidence should be made available to defendants and convicted 
persons upon request . . .. '' 71 In addition, the 1996 National Academies 
Report noted that "[a] wrongly accused person's best insurance against the 
possibility of being falsely incriminated is the opportunity to have the testing 
repeated.' ' 72 Many discovery rules explicitly provide for defense retesting or 
have been so construed, 73 and a number of cases have recognized a constitu-
tional right to retest evidence. 74 
Yet, the right to retest depends on the preservation of the evidence. In 
the 1970s, courts began to extend the Brady doctrine to the preservation of 
evidence.75 The right of preservation was extensively litigated in scientific 
evidence cases. Defendants successfully argued that this right had been 
violated by the prosecution's failure to preserve drugs, bullets, blood, urine, 
69 835 A.2d at 613. 
70 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE, DiscoVERY, Standard ll-3.2(b) (3d 
ed. 1996) ("Upon motion, either party should be permitted to conduct evaluations 
or tests of physical evidence in the possession or control of the other party which is 
subject to disclosure. The motion should specify the nature of the test or evaluation 
to be conducted, the names and qualifications of the experts designated to conduct 
evaluations or tests, and the material upon which such tests will be conducted.''). 
71 ABA House of Delegates, 2000 Annual Meeting, Report No. 115. 
72 NRC II, supra note 3, at 87. 
73 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.lM:w:INKELRIED, SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
ch. 3 (4th ed. 2007) (listing statutes and rules). The federal courts have read this 
right into the federal discovery rule: "In cases involving a controlled substance, 
courts have held a concomitant part of the examination or inspection to be the right 
of the accused to have an independent chemical analysis performed on the seized 
substance." United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
74 
"Fundamental fairness is violated when a criminal defendant . . . is denied 
the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards 
imposed by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject 
to varying expert opinion." Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
75 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (recognizing a due process right to 
exculpatory evidence upon request). In addition to due process, the right of preser-
vation may be supported by the compulsory process and right of confrontation 
guarantees. 
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and trace metal detection results, as well as physical evidence of arson, rape, 
and homicide.76 Nevertheless, the scope of the right remained uncertain. 
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 77 the Supreme Court addressed the issue in a 
case involving the failure to preserve semen in a sexual assault case. While 
bad faith is not a requirement in the Brady suppression cases, the Supreme 
Court nevertheless ruled it determinative in a failure to preserve situation. 
The Court wrote: "The failure of the police to refrigerate the clothing and to 
perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as negligent.'' 
Thus, Youngblood's claim was rejected, even though the evidence appeared 
critical. 
A. State Courts 
Some courts have found ''bad faith'' destruction, while numerous courts 
have not. This is not surprising since the standard is an extremely difficult 
one to satisfy. Indeed, the Youngblood approach was so out-of-line with no-
tions of basic faimess that an overwhelming majority of state courts rejected 
it as a matter of state law. As one court observed: ''Apparently only Arizona 
and California . . . have concluded that their state charters offer the same 
limited degree of protection as the federal constitution.' '78 That court went 
on to reject Youngblood as a matter of state constitutional law: "Like our 
sister states, we conclude that the good or bad faith of the police in failing to 
preserve potentially useful evidence [semen stains that could have been 
tested for DNA] cannot be dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has 
been deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, we, too, reject the litmus 
test of bad faith on the part of the police, which the United States Supreme 
Court adopted under the federal constitution in Youngblood.' ' 79 
Courts rejecting Youngblood have adopted several approaches. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court, for instance, has recognized an exception to the bad 
faith test where the evidence is so critical to the defense as to make a crimi-
76 See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 73, § 3-13. 
77 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
78 State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 594 n.20 (Conn. 1995). 
79 See also Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 n.9 
(Alaska 1989) ("We have construed the Alaska Constitution's Due Process Clause 
to not require a showing of bad faith."); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 
1990) (bad faith test too restrictive because it precludes courts "in cases where no 
bad faith is shown, from inquiring into the favorableness of the evidence or the prej-
udice suffered by the defendant as a result of its loss"); Commonwealth v. Hender-
son, 582 N.E.2d 496,497 (Mass. 1991) ("The rule under the due process provisions 
of the Massachusetts Constitution is stricter than that stated in the Youngblood 
opinion."); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W.Va. 1995) ("As a matter 
of state constitutional law, we find that fundamental fairness requires this Court to 
evaluate the State's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in the 
context of the entire record."); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Vt. 1994) 
(Youngblood decision "too narrow because it limits due process violations to only 
those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate bad faith, even though the 
negligent loss of evidence may critically prejudice a defendant"). 
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nal trial without it "fundamentally unfair. " 80 The court applied this excep-
tion in a prosecution for toxic waste dumping where the sole evidence-the 
samples tested-was not preserved. Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court 
rejected Youngblood and set forth a three-pronged analysis: (1) the degree of 
negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the importance of the missing evidence, 
considering the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute ev-
idence that remains available, and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence 
used at trial to sustain the conviction. 51 According to that court, ''We remain 
convinced that fundamental fairness, as an element of due process, requires 
the State's failure to preserve evidence that could be favorable to the defen-
dant '[to] be evaluated in the context of the entire record.' . . . When evi-
dence has not been preserved, the conduct of the State's agents is a relevant 
consideration, but it is not determinative.'' 
B.Exoneration 
The Youngblood test provides little incentive for police departments to 
adopt standard operating procedures that ensure the proper collection and 
preservation of evidence-procedures that in all likelihood would benefit the 
prosecution more in the long run. After having spent nine years in prison, 
Larry Youngblood was exonerated through DNA testing. Dr. Edward Blake, 
a DNA scientist, told a reporter: 
We now have before us a flawed legal precedent that stands on the 
shoulders of an innocent man . . . For those organizations that are poorly 
run or mismanaged or don't give a damn, ... the Youngblood case was 
a license to let down their guard and be lazy. The effect that had was gen-
erally to lower the standards of evidence collection. 52 
At this late date, the lack of procedures to preserve evidence should be 
considered "bad faith" under the Youngblood decision. 
Conclusion 
Pretrial discovery is critical when experts testify in criminal 
prosecutions. The Minnesota Supreme Court put it succinctly: '' [F]air trial 
and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a laboratory 
in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and 
cross examination.' ' 83 
80 Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992). 
81 Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted). 
82 Barbara Whitaker, DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justices Rejected Plea, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11,2000, at A12. 
83 State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989). 
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